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People who call political correctness "left wing McCarthyism" are correct in detecting a 
strong family resemblance, but there are important differences, too. And it will be helpful, if 
one wants to understand this much discussed phenomenon, to locate it in a wider historical and 
socio-psychological context. 
The earliest recorded instance of correctness of which I am aware is St. Paul's "Those 
who are not for me are against me." The attitude expressed in these words was, it would seem, 
something new in the Mediterranean world, which, for whatever reason, seems to have tolerated 
considerable diversity of belief. Amongst the Greeks, tolerance flowed from a lively scepticism, 
itself the result of a persistent intellectual curiosity. Herodotus, who was a great traveller and 
the earliest of sociologists, concluded from his study of the diverse customs of the peoples he 
visited that 
If one were to offer men to choose out of all the customs in ... the world such as 
seemed to them the best, they would ... examine the whole number and end by 
preferring their own; so convinced are they that their own usages far surpass those ... 
of all others (The Persian Wars, I, iii, 38). 
Any Greek who, like Herodotus, was enough of a scientist to adopt the attitude of a 
neutral observer toward the burial customs of other tribes (the immense diversity of burial 
practices being the topic under discusssion in the passage quoted) would be unlikely to rage 
against those whose practices differ from those of his own tribe, however much he himself 
might prefer those that are familiar to those that are different. He would be unlikely, that is to 
say, to hold that those who are not with him with respect to burial practices are against him. 
With the Romans, this unPauline attitude probably had a different source. Though the 
governing and administrative classes had certainly imbibed Greek culture, acceptance of 
diversity was probably less a matter of curiosity about the fact of diversity than of policy. 
Tolerance of diversity of religious belief, assimilation into the Roman pantheon of the gods of 
the lesser breeds whom they conquered, was doubtless recognized to be much more cost-
effective than a policy of suppression would have been. And where diversity of belief led to 
political deviation, the Romans could of course be ruthless, as the Jews had the misfortune to 
learn. But still, when all this has been discounted, the Roman policy of religious tolerance was 
possible only in a society whose level of anxiety about its own religious beliefs was low. 
Pauline Christianity thus brought something new into the world -- not death and all its 
woe, as Milton had it, nor even fear of death and yearning for immortality, inasmuch as these 
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were features of many contemporary mystery cults -- that of Mithra, for instance -- that, 
unlike Pauline Christianity, were tolerant of diversity. What marked the latter above all was 
fear of doing, saying or thinking something incorrect. 
From the point of view of the Roman administrators the behavior of the Christians was 
irrational: They were being asked only to say a few inconsequential words, to make a few 
inconsequential gestures, as tokens of political conformity; they could believe whatever they 
liked. But this step, that was so trivial for the Romans, was everything to the early Christians; 
one step away from correctness, however small it might seem to the Romans, was enough, they 
thought, to cast them into perdition: if one was not correct in all respects, one was wholly 
incorrect. 
When one contemplates the Roman mind and the early Christian mind slipping past each 
other again and again in mutual incomprehension, one hardly knows whether to laugh or to 
weep. But whether one laughs or weeps one must recognize that a profound change was 
occurring. Western culture had been infected with a virus -- the virus of correctness -- from 
which it has not yet recovered. 
There have been periods in which the disease has been in remission, some of them long 
enough to encourage optimists to believe that a cure has been found. But the history of culture, 
as one looks back across centuries and across continents, is the sorry record of the victimization 
of the incorrect -- Gnostics, Manichees, Donatists, Arians, Patripassians, Albigensians, 
Pelagians, Waldensians, Hussites .... The list could be extended indefinitely; I mention these not 
to recall their doctrines, for even their names have been forgotten by all but a few specialists, 
but to remind us of the many thousands who have been slaughtered, burned at the stake or 
otherwise sacrificed on the altars of correctness. 
It happens that all the cases I have just cited are examples of religous (perhaps one 
ought rather write "theological") correctness. That in a way is an accident of history and follows 
from the fact that down to the end of the 17th century the soul's salvation was the chief 
preoccupation in the West. It is important to understand that any set of beliefs whatever will be 
held to be correct if that set of beliefs is so stongly held that challenges to it are experienced as 
intolerable. 
The psychological drive underlying and animating the phenomenon of correctness was 
identified by Dewey as a quest for certainty, which he held accounts for all the great 
metaphysical constructions -- Platonic forms, Cartesians egos, Hegelian absolutes. Interpreted 
in this way, the activity of philosophers can be viewed as a relatively harmless waste of time 
that could be better spent, as Dewey said, improving our human traffic with nature and with 
other people. 
Dewey, it seems to me, was correct on three important points: first, that philosophers 
tend to be averse to living in conditions of uncertainty; second, that the world is a profoundly 
uncertain place; third, that, this being the case, philosophers will try to escape from this world 
into another, a secure one. What Dewey did not see, or what he underestimated, is the extent 
to which most people, not just philosophers, are risk-averse. Nor did he appreciate the fact 
that risk-aversion accounts for the phenomenon of correctness and so leads to behaviors that are 
far more malignant than metaphysical construction. The belief system of a strongly risk-averse 
person tends to be strongly cathected -- one wants one's belief in x, whatever x happens to be 
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and however one has come to believe x, to be correct; one doesn't want, once one has latched 
on to a bit of certainty by adopting x, to fall back into a condition of uncertainty by finding 
that other people challenge x. 
It follows that strongly cathected belief systems, however much they differ in respect to 
what happens to be believed, have always had a common structure or pattern, due to the fact 
that doubters must be suppressed lest their doubts come to infect those who hold the strongly 
held beliefs. Hence a strong exclusivity is imposed: if one is not completely correct, one is 
completely incorrect. Thus the Arians, who differed from the orthodox by no more than a 
dipthong, must be put down as rigorouly as the Manichees or the Albigensians with whom there 
were substantial disagreements. In a word, the best defense is attack. At some point a claim of 
self -evidence is therefore almost always made: since my belief is self -evidently true, your 
failure to acknowledge it is a sign that you are either a knave or a fool, in any case beyond the 
pale. 
Observe, too, that correctness usually generates an equal and opposite reaction. Just as 
there is a set of believers strongly committed to the correctness of x, whatever x happens to be 
-- consubstantiality of the Father and the Son, papal infallibility, infant baptism, total 
immersion, transubstantiation, episcopal supremacy, good works, a vernacular bible -- so there 
emerges a set of believers as strongly committed to the correctness of not-x, each group being 
made more anxious by the existence of the other. It is characteristic of the correctness 
phenomenon, then, that belief is not only strongly cathected but becomes bipolar in form, with 
the result that almost all outbreaks of correctness can be described in terms of the 17th century 
conflict in England between Laudian "thorough" and Puritan "root and branch," where each 
party was committed to the total extirpation of the other. 
How do outbreaks of the correctness virus end? -- for, so far, all have eventually ended. 
In the past, certainly, they have usually ended with the suppression of one or the other bipolar 
versions of correctness by the secular authority. The several versions of correctness that came, 
over time, to be the definition of orthodoxy, in contrast to the versions that came, over time, to 
be heretical, were those that were backed by succesive emperors. And one has the distinct 
impression that, had these heresies happened to have received imperial support, they would have 
become orthodox, and orthodoxy would have become heresy. 
Indeed, that is just what happened when the imperial power was divided between Rome 
and Constantinople. And even after Theodosius sided with Rome and orthdoxy, Arianism, 
driven from the East, survived for centuries on the fringes of the Empire, thanks to the 
Visigoths, who had been converted to this rival form of correctness. But an even clearer 
example of the decisive role of political authority in settling conflicts over correctness is the 
solution worked out on the Continent at the Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years 
War: Cuius regia euius religio -- each Prince's religion shall be the religion of his subjects --
with the result that what was orthodox on one bank of the Rhine or the Danube might be 
heresy across the river. 
But political solutions are immensely facilitated if the cathexsis loses some of its power 
-- if, that is, the rank ordering of preferences begins to change and goods other than the 
supreme good of being correct about the path to the soul's salvation are taken into account. 
This transformation began to occur in England toward the end of the 17th century. People 
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continued to want to be correct, but they were less passionate about it. Dissenters must have 
begun to weigh the costs of correctness in terms of the lost opportunities to participate in the 
new enterprise system -- opportunities that publicists like Defoe, himself a Dissenter, were 
tirelessly describing. Robinson Crusoe is much less an adventure story than it is a handbook 
promoting the advantages of colonial investment, and demonstrating the advantages of 
postponing gratification and teaching that success in amassing a fortune is a sign that one is 
favored by Providence and so among the elect. 
In this changing culture, though bipolar correctnesses might continue to glare at each 
other, increasing numbers of the correct -- that is, of the correct on both sides of the bipolar 
divide -- began to consider the possibility that they might be mistaken about the wickedness, 
and even about the incorrectness, of the incorrect: the children of the root-and- branch 
generation became willing to consider the possibility that "presbyter" might indeed be only 
"priest" writ large. 
As the rigid exclusiveness of correctness began to relax, life became viable for people 
who did not want to be sheerly for and sheerly against: qualifications and reservations and 
above all, compromises became possible. For instance, the compromise implicit in cuius regia, 
which paid for allowing interstate tolerance by reaffirming intrastate intolerance. 
Similarly, in England: the severity of the Act of Uniformity, which had been imposed at 
the Restoration and which was an expression of the exclusivity of correctness -- clergymen and 
teachers who did not publicly accept all the doctrines of the Church of England were totally 
excluded from all preferments -- came to be somewhat moderated, at the beginning of the next 
century, by the notion that "occasional conformity" to the rites of the Church of England was 
enough. And although this idea was slow to take on -- it was naturally anathema both to 
surviving advocates of "thorough" in the Church of England and to surviving advocates of "root-
and-branch" among the Dissenters -- it gradually became acceptable to a government and a 
people who were in search of domestic peace as a basis for prosperity. 
Thus occasional conformity and cuius regia were typical political compromises that by 
offering something to all parties deeply offended the Pauline exclusiveness associated with 
correctness. Such compromises became acceptable only because changes in the social, political 
and intellectual environment were reducing the rank-ordering that had previously been assigned 
to being, at all costs, correct. 
What was being played out, over and over again, during all these centuries was a kind of 
"dialectic" -- to use a currently fashionable term -- between purity and power. Correctness 
yearned for perfect purity, which it knew could not be attained in this, but only in a higher, 
world. Yet, despite its awareness of the danger of contact with this world, purity was seldom 
content to renounce it (Christian hermits like St. Simon Stylites are exceptions). Again and 
again, purity has been seduced into believing that, given access to enough power, it could 
reproduce its own perfection in this world (for instance, in a company of saints). 
Power, on the other hand, suffered no illusions about purity. It sometimes went into 
battle to defend one purity against the other; it sometimes miscalculated the strength of the 
passions that are generated by the desire for perfect purity, so that it lost control of them. But 
it usually sooner or later brought those passions under its control and found ways of diverting 
their energies to its own ends. 
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If these paragraphs are acceptabale as a quick summary of the history of correctness in 
the West down to the end of the 17th century, which is the history, specifically, of religious 
correctness, one can say that since the beginning of the 18th century in the increasingly secular 
and largely scientific culture of the West there have been few outbreaks of the correctness virus 
in its religious form (the conflict in Ireland being a painful and unresolved exception) and 
relatively few outbreaks of the virus in any form. 
There have certainly been wars, and on a scale and of a magnitude earlier unknown. 
But, save for the Civil War in this country, these have seldom been exacerbated by 
entanglement in the correctness phenomenon. The slavery issue, however, certainly did generate 
the now familiar pattern of exclusiveness, in which those who are not wholly for us are taken to 
be wholly against us. And this issue is still so powerfully cathected that it has survived in its 
correctness form until today. Thus it turned up in some of the comments on The Civil War 
television series, in which the Emancipation Proclamation was condemned from the root-and-
branch point of view that political solutions are always wicked concessions to evil. 
Certainly communism, as much as slavery, has generated passions capable of conversion 
into bipolarized correctnesses. And we have been saved from war against Reagan's Evil Empire 
partly by good luck and partly by healthy respect for MAD, which is to say, by a radical 
revision in the rank-ordering of preferences, in which for many people physical survival came 
to have a higher value than salvation, or even capitalism -- better red than dead. 
But wars apart, in the West during the last two or three centuries, differences of 
opinion, even differences with respect to issues that have been highly cathected and bipolar in 
form, have more often than not been resolved by means of some mutually agreed-on political 
process. 
This was possible because of the gradual emergence of an attitude of mind, not unlike 
that manifested by Herodotus, that has disposed people to look at even their most highly 
cathected values in a context of alternative possible ways of seeing and valuing the world. That 
attitude has distanced people a bit from their own values and so has diluted the passions that 
would otherwise be generated. Again, advances, first in physics, then in biology and even in 
the so-called human sciences, encouraged people, now that there seemed to be a reliable way of 
ascertaining what is the case, to distinguish between what they were initially disposed to believe 
was the case and what might eventually might turn out to be the case. In a word, something 
like a secular version of the protestant ethic began to operate generally. People became willing 
to postpone the instant gratification derived from being certain that their beliefs were correct; 
some were even ready on occasion to admit, in the light of new evidence, that they had been 
mistaken. 
Outside the West the story has been very different. In the Middle East correct Sunnis 
confront correct Sufis; in the subcontinent, correct Pakistani confront correct Hindus, who are 
also confronted in Punjab by correct Sikhs; in Sri Lanka correct Tamils confront correct 
Buddhists . . . Wherever one looks, one finds the now familiar pattern repeating itself: highly 
cathected correctnesses confronting one another, with no possibility of resolution, either by a 
political process all parties accept or by an appeal to agreed-on criteria of evidence regarding 
what is the case. It seems unlikely that anything approaching political or social stability can be 
achieved in any of these societies until in the fullness of time the passion for being correct at 
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all costs is moderated by the kind of respect for evidence regarding what is the case that I have 
tried to describe as an important element in Western culture. 
This brings me at long last to political correctness. What family resemblances does it 
share with all these other earlier and contemporary correctnesses? How does it differ from 
them? How long-lived and how disruptive is it likely to be? 
Political correctness is obviously like all those other correctnesses in being highly 
cathected and committed to imposing its version of correctness, so far as it has the power to do 
so, on everybody else. Like those other correctnesses, it is not leavened by a sense of humor or 
of perspective. Its mentalite conforms to the Pauline pattern that has now become so familiar. 
Is it also driven, as those other correctnesses have been, by a quest for certainty? That 
is less obviously the case. Indeed, there is an ambiguity in the meaning of "correctness," as the 
politically correct use this term -- an ambiguity that may be deliberate and that in any event is 
proving very useful to them. The politically correct may hold, (1) that their views are 
politically correct in the way in which the Arians, for instance, or the Hussites held their views 
to be theologically correct. That is, the politically correct may hold that their views are (i) 
about politics (instead of about theology), and also (ii) true. 
Or they may hold (2) that their views are politically correct in the sense that they 
represent opinions that, whilst not presently approved by the majority, are the wave of the 
future. That is, they are opinions that are politically powerful in that they will lead to political 
change. From this point of view, to call an opinion correct is not to make a truth-claim 
regarding this opinion, which was certainly the claim of all earlier versions of correctness and is 
probably the belief of some current advocates of political correctness. Rather, to call an 
opinion politically correct is to make a prediction about the prospects for that opinion, and to 
make it in language that is calculated to promote the movement of opinion in the desired 
direction. 
The strategy of the language game that is being played is familiar and is well 
represented by "You look to be not long for this world," spoken by a son who is waiting 
impatiently for the death of an elderly parent. In a word, what drives this form of politically 
correctness is not a longing for purity, but a longing for power. 
From whence might this version of political correctness be derived? There are two 
distinct but overlapping sources, neo-Marxism and deconstruction. Since the former was first 
in the field and is also the easier to understand, I will begin with it. Neo-Marxists find 
congenial the version of Marxism expressed in such works as the Theses on Feuerbach: 
The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a 
question of theory but is a practical question. In practice man must prove the truth, i.e., 
the reality and power, the "this-sidedness" of his thinking. The dispute over the reality 
or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic 
question .... The philosophers [sc., scientists] have interpreted the world in various ways; 
the point, however, is to change it. 
Neo-Marxists do not allow themselves to be troubled by the conflict between this 
Marxism and the Marxism of The Manifesto and Capital, which asserts the "scientific" 
correctness (i.e., truth) of Marxism. From the point of view of these works Marx's prediction 
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that the state will wither away was not an assertion made in the hope that making it would 
cause the state to wither away; it was, for better or worse, a forecast as reliable as the forecast 
of a solar or lunar eclipse. In a word, the claim being made here to correctness is a truth-claim 
(correct = true), and this corresponds exactly to the truth-claims made earlier for all the various 
versions of metaphysical-thelogical correctness. 
Nor do neo-Marxists allow themselves to be embarrassed by the self-referentiality of 
their favorite version of Marxism: that is, the corrosion that occurs when one asks whether the 
propositions put forward in the Theses apply to those propositions themselves. And if not, why 
not? There it is asserted flatly that "The question whether objective truth can be attributed to 
human thinking is not a question of theory [i.e., of truth] but is a practical question." 
Well, if one is not already wedded to neo-Marxism one is inclined to ask at this point: 
what sort of claim is being made for that assertion? Is a truth-claim being made for it? If not, 
why should I attend to what is being said? But if a truth claim is being made, then, at least in 
connection with this particular assertion, we are not dealing with a practical question. The 
general claim that all questions are practical questions has been falsified in the course of being 
stated -- quite an achievement. 
No wonder then that neo-Marxists avoid thinking about such awkward and embarrassing 
matters as the problem of self -referentiality: thinking about them (or allowing others to think 
about them) would interfere with the social and political agenda to which the politically correct 
are committed. 
That political correctness is deeply marked by this neo-Marxist line of descent is evident 
from the frequency with which "empowerment" is described as the aim of education. "The real 
issue is power: who has it and who does not." It is ceaselessly asserted that the educational 
system, the curriculum, appointment and tenure policy are in the hands of an upper-class elite, 
who use the resources of national offices and national foundations to maintain and expand their 
hegemony. There is, it is said, nothing new about this; what is new is that we -- "we" is in the 
first place literary critics and, in the second place, the underprivileged, the excluded gender and 
ethic minorities -- have learned what is going on and are exposing the upper-class, capitalist 
plot. 
It is not argued that it would be only "fair" for us to have power, too, or that it is "our 
turn." That line of reasoning never appeals to the correct; imagine the Albigensians arguing for 
their position on grounds of fair play. No; the correct never argue. In the case of the 
politically correct they just state that they lack power and that they intend to get it. Thus one 
of the politically correct has written, with surprising frankness, that he finds it "tempting to 
turn the curriculum into an instrument of social transformation," as a result of which the 
powerless would become empowered. 
So much, for the moment for the neo-Marxist route to political correctness. The second, 
and much more sophisticated, route starts from Saussure's account of reference. That words 
refer is obvious -- they have meaning. But to what, generally, do they refer? To what, for 
instance, does the term "horse" refer? Most people would say that it refers indifferently to any 
one of a number of animals in the real world, that can be described in such-and-such a way, a 
way that sufficiently distinguishes them from other animals in the real world. When animals are 
discovered somewhere in the real world that are look-alikes, but all the same not horses (e.g., 
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mules, donkeys, zebras), the newly noted differences can be added to the definition of "horse," 
and we proceed as before. No problem. 
But Saussure and the deconstructivists see only problems, insoluble problems. And for 
the following reason: They point out that if words referred to extra-textual objects like horses, 
donkeys, and zebras, as the procedure that I have just outlined assumes, reference can never be 
closed, complete and determinate. There is a possibility (doubtless very remote) that some 
zoologist somewhere or other, some time or other, will come across an animal which cannot be 
definitively classified as either a horse or a not-horse. Thus people will never be able to know 
exactly what they mean. 
Agreed. But people who are not victims of the exclusivity pattern of thinking that is so 
characteristic of the correctness phenomenon are not greatly troubled to have it pointed out that 
the hypothesis of extra-textual reference can never yield absolutely fixed, determinate 
reference. It is enough for them if reference can become determinate enough to conduct the 
various language games which they want to play. 
But for the politically correct that is intolerable. For them, it is with reference as it is, 
in the older forms of correctness, with sin. Just as even the most venal of sins infects and 
totally corrupts the perfect purity of virtue, so the tiniest amount of indeterminacy in reference 
totally corrupts the perfect purity of knowledge. Since the root of the problem is the claim that 
reference is extra-textual, the politically correct conclude that extra-textuality must be 
extirpated root-and-branch. Words refer, but they refer only intra-textually, that is, to other 
words. 
Note that the mentality making this inference is the mentality of thorough applied to 
reference, instead of to members of the Church of England. It is the mentality encountered in 
orthodoxy: whoever deviates in any respect whatever is a heretic; it is the mentality encountered 
in American First Last and Always: whoever is not 100% is a crypto-communist. It is the 
mentality encountered in St. Paul's "Whoever is not for me is against me." 
That mentality is the source of the inference to intratextuality. We should spell out a bit 
the consequences of the inference. Consider, then, the word "centaur": It is far from 
meaningless; therefore it refers. But nobody thinks it refers to real-life centaurs in the way 
that many people believe "horse" refers to real-life horses. "Centaur," everybody agrees, refers 
intra-textually, to Greek myths recorded by Homer and other poets, to red- and black-figure 
drawings on pots, and so on. That is exactly the way "horse" refers, according to the 
deconstructivists: to the various texts by zoologists, race horse owners, breeders, agronomists and 
the like in which the word "horse" occurs. And so, according to the deconstructivists, for all 
terms whatever, without exception. 
Let us be sure we understand how very radical the decontructivist position on 
intratextuality is. I shall therefore give a real-life example. It is so simple that it will seem 
trivial, but it has the advantage of bringing out the essential point very clearly. 
Among the letters in a recent (May 16, 1991) issue of The New York Review of Books is 
one by Lord Zuckerman, discussing a possible hoax perpetrated by two schoolboys in 1911. 
The boys presented their science master at Sherborne School with "a piece of old bone on which 
was scratched the head of a horse," telling him that they had found it in a quarry. Was the 
bone a fossil? If a fossil, had it been incised recently or in ancient times? And if incised 
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recently, was it a hoax by the boys or did they find it, planted in the quarry by other hands? 
Lord Zuckerman gives an amusing summary of investigations of the bone that have continued 
to this day, and he ends his letter with the hope that the "debate" will continue. 
For the deconstructivists there is no more to the bone than this continuing, inconclusive 
debate. Derrida would characterize it as a dance around an empty hole -- empty because there 
is no bone to be found where people who have not reflected on Saussure's theory of reference 
foolishly expect there to be a bone. 
Despite Saussure and Derrida, I believe, and I think Lord Zuckerman believes, that there 
is more to the bone than the debate. In fact, the debate has a point only because there is a 
bone, only because with respect to the bone something is the case. That is to say, Derrida's 
hole is not empty; there is a bone in it. Some of what is the case regarding the bone is known 
-- for instance, its weight and its dimensions. Much that is the case is now unknown and, 
despite presumably continuing improvement in the methodologies available to paleontologists 
and anthropologists, may never be known. 
To believe that something is the case about the bone -- that Derrida's hole is not empty, 
but occupied by the bone -- makes it possible to distinguish amongst segments of the Derridean 
dance -- to distinguish those that are sheer fantasy, those that are highly speculative, and those 
that have only a surface plausibility from those that are likely correct, i.e., probably true. And 
this belief that something is the case about the bone -- that is the point I want to emphasize --
operates as a check, as a break, on any tendency we might have to fantasize about the bone, to 
indulge in wish-fulfilment. 
To believe with the deconstructivists that nothing is the case about the bone because 
nothing can be known with certainty to be the case about the bone -- to believe that because 
no hypothesis about the bone or about the boys' intentions can be fully verified, no hypothesis 
is more probably true than any other -- is to believe that the hole is empty. If one believes 
that, one can then sit back in a relaxed mood, and feel superior to all those who have vainly 
attempted to fill the hole. 
To believe that -- to be relieved of the burden of trying to ascertain what is cognitively 
correct (i.e., true) -- releases one to believe what is politically correct (i.e., promotes one's own 
political agenda). Thus, if a deconstructivist holds that schools like Sherborne are citadels of 
privilege dedicated to maintaining the superior standing of the gentry, he will select a segment 
of the dance in which it is fantasized that the bone is not a fossil and that the boys' motive in 
incising it was to secure their admission to one of the Oxbridge colleges. And, having 
denominated this segment as politically correct, he would denounce all other segments as 
politically incorrect and regard himself as justified in trying to suppress them. 
Not that the deconstructivists actually come out and say any of this as explicitly as I 
have just been sketching it. Naturally no. To do so would be seriously to undermine the force 
of what is politically correct. Hence, ever since Derrida injudiciously blurted out that there is 
no such thing as a beyond-text: Il n'y a d' hors-texte, though that is the only possible 
conclusion to draw from the Saussurean theory of reference, the deconstructivists have for most 
part evaded this point. They deal with it as Neo-Marxists deal with the embarrassment of self-
referentiality. But like the neo-Marxists, they continue to act on the belief. And here, as so 
often, actions speak louder than silences. 
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Although I fear this discussion of deconstruction and its impact on political correctness 
has become tedious, there is one more strand that must be disentangled. It is the lesson that the 
deconstructivists learned from Heidegger's re-writing of the history of philosophy. The history 
of Western culture since the pre-Socratics, acccording to Heidegger, is the history of fatal 
entrapment in a "logocentric" conceptual scheme, one organized into a number of dichotomies, 
amongst them self/object, inside/outside, below/above, we/they, active/passive and, dichotomy 
of all dichotomies, Aristotle's law of excluded middle: either A or not-A. Obviously, this 
Heideggerian version of the history of language and culture, at least as it is deployed by the 
deconstructivists, has an immediate relevance to the embarrassments and contradictions to be 
found in the writings of the neo-Marxists. Contradiction, it turns out, is nothing to be 
concerned about, for the notion of contradiction is no more than a product of logocentrism. 
Thus in Differance Derrida magnanimously allows that some of the concepts Heidegger 
introduces involves a contradiction, for instance, the concept of "trace." But that is no problem, 
for one can think without a contradition, or at least without granting any pertinence to 
such a contradiction, what is perceptible and imperceptible in the trace .... Heidegger can 
therefore, in a contradiction without a contradiction, consign, countersign, the sealing of 
the trace. 
This Derridean version of Heidegger's logocentrism is obviously immensely useful to those who 
buy into it, and one might suppose that the ideal situation for the politically correct would be 
one in which they and they alone recognize the limitations of logocentrism, leaving everyone 
else victimized by it. 
Yet, somewhat inconsistently (but who cares about inconsistency?) the deconstructivists 
look forward to a time when logocentrism will be transcended. In Differance Derrida wrote 
about what he called "Heideggerian hope," which seems to amount to praising the virtues of 
silence, but in the earlier "The Ends of Man," written in the spring of 1968 and coincident with 
the student uprisings in Paris, he had optimistically suggested that more than two millenia of 
logocentrism might be ending and that a wholly new language, and with it, a radically new way 
of experiencing the world and so of re-organizing the culture and the institutions by which it is 
maintained and transmitted, might be dawning. 
This sense of the possibility of revolutionary change just around the corner has played 
an important part, I believe, in forming the political correctness movement. The passion that 
animated earlier occurrences of the correctness phenomenon was based on the conviction that 
one's correctness was guaranteed by God, by natural law, or by what-is-the-case, the latter 
ascertainable by objective, scientific inquiry modelled on the activity of "the never enough to be 
admired Mr. Newton". 
Since, for the politically correct, God, natural law and what-is-the-case are (by the 
deconstructivist route) all alike products of logocentric linguistic fallicies, and (by the neo-
Marxist route) myths constructed by the capitalist class with the aim of maintaining its political 
and social hegemony, the passion needed to sustain the correctness movement in the present 
instance has to be generated in a different way. What launched it, I believe, was the sense 
(Derrida again) that we are living at the edge of a time of change, of change so radical and so 
unpredictable that Derrida himself can say only that it "tries to pass beyond man and 
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humanism." 
Thus the passion that launched political correctness was also based on a vision, but not a 
vision of another world -- neither God's world nor of a world of transcendent Platonic forms 
nor yet again the world of Newtonian physics. Rather, it was a vision of this world, but of this 
world transformed by political action. So far, that passion has been sustained by a series of 
remarkable successes in American colleges and universities. But the academic environment is a 
special and limited one, and the question, to which I will return later, is how long a passion for 
correctness that depends on hope, rather than on a conviction that one has got it right about the 
way the world is, can survive defeat and frustration. 
Thus, as things now stand, neo-Marxism and deconstruction mutually reinforce one 
another in a number of important ways. It is worth pointing out, however, that they do diverge 
at one point: to the extent that the Women's Movement reads the Heideggerian scenario not as 
the history of logocentrism but as the history of phallocratism, there is a difference of opinion 
amongst the politically correct about who the chief enemy is -- the capitalist class in particular 
or males in general. But since most capitalists are and have been males, there turns out to be 
less a difference of grand strategy than of tactics between the Women's Movement and the rest 
of the politically correct. 
Taken together, then, neo-Marxism and deconstruction provided humanists and the 
softer social scientists who were discontent with the place alloted to them in the educational 
establishment with what seemed a powerful weapon for undermining the set of values on which 
the pecking order of that establishment is based and its resources are allocated. And indeed the 
weapon proved immensely successful, at least when applied to the parts of the establishment 
(e.g., the departmental structures of the humanities) in which they were directly involved. 
The weapon was first deployed (in its deconstructist version only) by literary critics 
against the literary critical establishment, which held -- and had long held -- that the business 
of literary critics is to interpret texts, and that the question to ask in evaluating literary critics 
was: Have they got it right about the meaning of the text? The meaning of the text (what it 
meant to its author, alternatively what it meant to contemporary or nearly contemporary 
readers) was a what-is-the-case, doubtless more difficult to ascertain than the what-is-the case 
concerning Lord Zuckerman's bone, but not in principle different. 
Deconstruction first had an impact on literary criticism, and it did so because it 
liberated literary critics who adopted it from the burden of trying to get it right about the 
meaning of a text; it freed them to do their own thing, to be authors too, not merely deferential 
interpreters of other peoples' texts. They could now, under the guise of explicating other 
authors' texts, produce texts of their own that were, each in its own way, often more inventive 
and creative than those earlier texts had been. It was all great fun! No wonder deconstruction 
appealled to many literary critics. 
Mutatis mutandis for historians and for the softer social scientists, not only some 
anthropologists and some sociologists but also law school professors. But take historians as 
representative of all such "interpretative" scholars: Thanks to their literary-critical colleagues, 
historians began to realize that deconstruction liberated them from the labor of studying 
documents in the hope of discovering, as Ranke had put it, wie es eigentlich gewesen war. 
Further, at this point the appeal of deconstruction is likely to be reinforced by neo-
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Marxism. It informs the historian that, since all those earlier historical narratives were but 
reflections of the class interests of their authors, she would do well to construct a version of the 
past that promotes the interests of her own class and gender. Hence a convinced 
deconstructivist historian, who might have continued to read documents merely out of force of 
habit or for the pleasure of reading what she has come to realize are no more than disguised 
historical romances, now had a wholly new incentive for reading documents and constructing 
narratives. 
And this incentive can amount to a passion -- not the old cognitive passion for getting it 
as nearly right as one can about what happened, but a "practical" passion, the passion for 
advancing one's values, whether those of one's class, or one's gender, or one's personal values as 
one moves up the tenure ladder. (Old-fashioned, pre-deconstructivist academic types were of 
course not uninterested in advancing up the tenure tract, nor were they uninfluenced by 
political agendas. But these interests had to some extent to compete with, and sometimes lost 
out to, another interest, one based on the belief that something is the case and that it was their 
business as professors to try to find out what it was.) 
In many humanities departments the seductions of deconstruction and neo-Marxism 
combined to make political correctness dominant. A rapid takeover occurred. These initial 
successes encouraged their hopes, and strengthened hope fostered an even fiercer and so more 
intolerant passion, which in its turn produced new successes. The politically correct seem ready 
for new conquests. How successful are they likely to be? 
Certainly humanists and the softer social scientists are not the only people in the 
educational system who have reason to be discontent with their standing in society, or who feel 
themselves gravely undervalued by the political and economic system in which the system of 
higher education is embedded -- underpaid, badgered by legislative and congressional 
committees, and denied the funding important for their research. And outside the educational 
system there are large numbers of people -- women, gays and lesbians, ethnic minorities --
with even stronger reasons for discontent with the political, social and economic status quo. 
Can the arts of persuasion that were so successful in winning humanists and the softer 
social scientists over to political correctness be equally effective outside these fields? If, as I 
have argued, political correctness is distinguished from earlier forms of correctness in being 
based on the radical cognitive relativism of neo-Marxism and deconstruction, then the answer to 
that question depends on the answer to another question: How disposed are most people to 
suspend belief, even belief in what they want to believe, pending evidence that what they want 
to believe is the case. How likely are they to abandon a belief to which they have become 
attached, because someone presents them with evidence that it is not the case? 
Here I must distinguish. Hard scientists, whether in or outside the educational system, 
on the whole take evidence seriously. So, for that matter, do most well educated people; that 
indeed is what is meant by calling them "well educated." (One understands that the politically 
correct will strongly dissent; what I have just written is an example of the myth of 
logocentrism/phallocratism at its worst.) Accordingly, it seems to me unlikely that political 
correctness will make much headway among hard scientists. They will not find political 
correctness remotely plausible; if anything, they will be too wedded to a scientism which 
assumes not only that something is the case but that what it is has already been ascertained. 
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And if these hard scientists ever find themselves under heavy pressure from the politically 
correct they will get help from the central administration; unlike the humanists, they will be 
judged too valuable to be left defenseless to sink or swim on their own. 
The situation is quite different with respect to the larger public. Here things look much 
more promising for the politically correct. Whether one looks at the public schools in this 
country or at the media, one is impressed by the manipulation of opinion that now goes on in 
the press and, above all, in television. One loses confidence that this larger public has any 
feeling for what-is-the-case, or that, as things stand, there is any serious restraint on people's 
readiness to believe whatever they want to believe -- or, rather, whatever the manipulators of 
opinion want them to believe. 
So the question really is, can the politically correct get control of the levers of power by 
first gaining accesss to the media and then managing to dominant them? That they can seems 
doubtful. One can imagine -- better, perhaps, fantasize -- a scenario in which, given military 
and/or economic disaster on a sufficiently large scale, the politically correct might seize power 
in a coup d'etat. 
If they succeeded, something like the world described in 1984 and Animal Farm would 
likely emerge: a world in which an inner group of Napoleons manipulate the lives of a large 
number of Majors, in the best interests, of course, of the Majors. That the politically correct in 
power would be ruthless seems likely, for the spirit of correctness has always been the spirit of 
thorough, the spirit of root-and- branch. And in the case of the politically correct, realpolitik 
would not be tempered by internalization of any such phallocratic myths as moral laws. 
But that, happily, is a remote possibility. If the politically correct are to move out of 
the academic sphere into the political arena, it is much more likely they will have to learn the 
arts of compromise that all politicians must practice. To do that the politically correct will have 
to abandon their Pauline-like belief that those who are not wholly for them are wholly against 
them. And practicing the political arts will not be easy, at least if the current situation on 
campus reflects the mood of ethnic minorities generally. For what is striking about the former 
is precisely the tendency of the minorities to segregate themselves voluntarily from each other, 
rather than to unite against what the politically correct perceive to be the common enemy --
the dead, white European males (DWEMs) who still dominate the curriculum. 
That the politically correct will be unable to accomplish such a radical transformation of 
themselves should not be assumed. We have seen again and again how the purity of correctness 
has succumbed to the seductions of power. It would be foolish to suggest that this will not 
happen again. But if it does, political correctness will cease to be itself, cease to be correct. It 
will fade out into the light of common day, becoming no more than one more of those many 
reform movements that rise, have their brief day and disappear. 
That this will be the fate of political correctness is a consumation devoutly to be wished, 
less because it is dangerous itself than because of the bipolar counter-correctness that it is likely 
to generate unless it does swiftly disappear. 
The initial reaction to political correctness was puzzlement: what was the bother all 
about? People could not see why they should take seriously a view that concentrated so much 
attention, so much passion, on usage, on getting accepted a term of which they approved --
"African American," for instance, instead of "Black." Hence they countered political correctness 
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by jest and the invention of terminological absurdities. 
We can now see that ridicule is an inappropriate response: the politically correct have 
taken to heart the lesson Orwell taught in his discussion of New Speak in 1984: those who 
control the language in which people speak and think control their behavior as well. But those 
who did not trace out this literary genealogy or, tracing it, were not persuaded of the dangers 
Orwell saw, were put off by the terminological strictness and exclusiveness of the politically 
correct. As it became clear that the politically correct were prepared to enforce severe 
sanctions against anybody guilty of deviant usage, the response shifted from ridicule to 
constitutional law: lawyer-like arguments based on the First Amendment began to appear. 
That is about where we stand now. Although a bipolar confrontation has not yet 
emerged, there are signs that one is forming. And if political correctness survives long enough, 
a counter-correctness will almost certainly take shape, led by the Blooms and the Bennetts, 
reaffirming the correctness of the old absolutes of "Judea-Christian civilization." Once again 
there would be two correctnesses glaring at each other, with pressure on everyone to choose 
sides, to be for or against. 
That, in my view, would be a most unfortunate regression, a relapse into an earlier stage 
in Western culture, which one would have hoped had been left behind. Certainly, if one simply 
counts centuries, one has to agree that during most of its history Western culture can be 
characterized, in some very loose way, as having had a Judeo-Christian flavor. But why count 
centuries? Why not allow the possibility of there having been some improvement in the way in 
which Western societies deal with deep social conflicts and, even more generally, with their 
quest for certainty? 
This change, which has increasingly marked Western societies since the period known as 
the Enlightenment, looks to the Blooms and the Bennetts, and to the correct of every generation 
and every clime, as a weakness. But according to V.S. Naipaul, it is, paradoxically, the great 
strength of the West. Writing recently about questions he had been asked to discuss in a paper 
for the Manhattan Institute in New York, he observed: 
It was easy to read through the questions to some of the anxieties that lay behind the 
questions. There was a clear worry about certain fanaticisms "out there." At the same 
time there was a certain philosophical diffidence about how that anxiety could be 
expressed .... You know how words can be used: I am civilized and steadfast, you are 
barbarian and fanatical.... But ... I couldn't share the pessimism implied by the questions. 
I felt that the very pessimism of the questions, and their philosophical diffidence, 
defined the strength of the civilization out of which it issued (NYRB, Jan. 31, 1991). 
That, rather than the counter-attack now being assembled by the defenders of the Judea-
Christian tradition, is an eloquent version of the response I hope will be made to the politically 
correct. 
Such a response, rephrased in the vocabulary I have been using, would be the antithesis 
to all correctnesses and all counter-correctnesses, in that it would rest on the conviction that the 
educational system, despite all its failings, is still capable of producing citizens who can accept 
the possibility that they are mistaken, citizens who can get on -- live, even thrive -- in a state 
of cognitive and moral uncertainty. To reply to political correctness in this way would itself be 
to act in a state of uncertainty. It would itself be evident that here in the West an alternative to 
correctness and counter-correctness is still possible. 
